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3. Conclusion
The Resolution meets the substantive objections of the GATT Panel to existing
§ 337 practice. It proposes changes that would not significantly weaken § 337
as a border measure against infringing imports while assuring compliance with
GATT obligations of the U.S. The Resolution does not introduce new procedures
that may create GATT problems. It deserves the support of the Association.
Respectfully submitted,
Louis B. Sohn
Chair
Section of International
Law and Practice

August 1993

IV. Uruguay Round*
RECOMMENDATION
BE IT RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association supports the conclusion without undue delay of the Uruguay Round with agreements that would
improve the world trading system and promote global economic prosperity;
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association urges the
United States government to support the strengthening of existing GATT multilateral dispute resolution procedures, through the adoption of measures such as: the
development of a unitary dispute procedure, reform of the procedure to consider
approval of dispute panel reports, increased transparency, utilization of scientific
expertise, and the creation of procedures for appeal of GATT panel reports;
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association urges the
United States government to support the establishment of an effective multilateral
trade organization that would serve as the institutional framework for better
implementation of the substantive rules resulting from the Uruguay Round.

REPORT
I. Overview
Through this Recommendation, the American Bar Association would express
its support for the conclusion, without undue delay, of the Uruguay Round of
*Professor John H. Jackson was primarily responsible for the development of this Recommendation
and Report.
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multilateral trade negotiations, with sound agreements that are essential to
strengthen the existing multilateral dispute resolution procedures and to create
a multilateral trade organization.
The successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round is critically important to
global prosperity, a point made by Western finance and trade ministers and heads
of state with increasing frequency and sense of urgency over the last few years.
The American Bar Association has repeatedly endorsed the United States' participation in the multilateral trade talks, viewing these talks as essential to continued
U.S. economic growth.
The Recommendation supports the general approach of the draft agreements
reached in the Uruguay Round on dispute resolution procedures and a multilateral
trade organization, although it does not endorse every detail of those agreements
in part due to the ongoing nature of the negotiations.
The dispute settlement reforms of the Uruguay Round are of fundamental importance to achieving a strong and stable multilateral trading system. Without effective
dispute settlement procedures, international economic conflicts will fester and nations will pay little mind to the substantive trade rules. The proposed reforms would
greatly improve the effectiveness of the GATT dispute settlement procedures, by
eliminating the offending country's ability to block GATT adoption of dispute panel
reports and creating a due process system of appeal in its place. In this way, the
rule of law would be advanced over political expediency. In addition, the reforms
would improve multilateral dispute resolution by creating a unified dispute resolution procedure in place of the current plethora of separate procedures.
Similarly, the institutional framework for multilateral trade will be central to
the implementation of the existing substantive rules and those agreed to in the
Uruguay Round. Yet this necessary institutional framework does not now exist.
The current GATT was never intended to be an organization and therefore was
never given an adequate institutional structure to facilitate the development and
orderly implementation of multilateral trade rules. The establishment of a multilateral trade organization would provide a sound institutional foundation for international trade, permit greater adaptability to a dynamic and increasingly complex
international commercial context, and encourage countries to accept all the obligations of the world trading system and build upon them with new negotiated
obligations as required by developments in world trade.
This focus on dispute resolution and institutional measures is particularly appropriate for the American Bar Association, since lawyers have special expertise in these
areas. If the present Recommendation is accepted, it may make a significant contribution to the constructive development of United States international trade policy.
II. Importance of a Rule-Oriented Liberal World Trading System
There is broad consensus that a liberal international trading system is essential
to promote global prosperity. Expanding trade stimulates growth by opening new
VOL. 28, NO. 2
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markets for exporters and by freeing resources and stimulating productivity in
importing countries. Low trade barriers also encourage needed capital and technology flows through investments abroad. For instance, an entrepreneur who is
considering investing in a small developing country may find that the investment
is only feasible if the goods can be exported. A liberal trading system with clear
and enforceable rules assures investors of access to third country markets. To
foster these goals, the United States has led international efforts over the last 50
years to build a strong and stable world trading system.
Liberal trade rules also have a direct and beneficial impact for United States
consumers. By lowering trade barriers and establishing rules of trade, liberal
trade rules foster cross-border competition and result in lower prices and increased
selection at the retail level. A liberal trading system permits United States industries that enjoy comparative advantages in the global marketplace to expand
output, leading to increased employment opportunities for United States citizens.
The American Bar Association (ABA) has repeatedly endorsed the United
States' support of a liberal world trading system that includes effective multilateral
rules and institutions. The ABA has endorsed the ongoing Uruguay Round of
multilateral talks as necessary "to preserve and to strengthen the current multilateral trading system and to liberalize trade further on a mutually fair and reciprocal
basis."' The ABA has recently endorsed the establishment of "principles, rules,
procedures, and institutions for the conduct of trade" in the context of the North
American Free Trade Agreement. 2
Despite the importance of a rule-oriented and liberal trading system, there is
substantial uncertainty surrounding the Uruguay Round. Recent years have seen
increasing use of trade restrictions throughout the world, together with greater
reliance on unilateral trade remedies such as the United States' use of Section
301 procedures to redress perceived violations. The delayed conclusion of the
Uruguay Round has aggravated these trends, as nations have refused to comply
with GATT rulings pending completion of the talks. Rapid completion of the
Uruguay Round is essential to address these problems. In particular, strengthened
multilateral rules and institutions are needed to build confidence in the trading
system and to encourage compliance with internationally-agreed measures. Without an adequate system to monitor and enforce the rules of the trade system, the
effectiveness of these rules will be substantially diminished.
I. Historical Background of GATT Institutional Issues
The GATT has its origins in the post-World War II consensus that stronger
international economic institutions were needed to prevent a recurrence of the
protectionist measures and ensuing retaliation that were considered to be a major

1. 1986 Annual Meeting, Recommendation 113A.
2. 1993 Winter Meeting, Recommendation 109B.
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cause of the depression and the war. To this end, the United States led international
negotiations in 1946-48 to prepare the charter for an International Trade Organization (ITO), and to negotiate an initial agreement to reduce tariffs, and to draft
substantive clauses relating to the tariff obligations. The latter two elements would
constitute the GATT.
The ITO, rather than the GATT, was intended to be the institution that would
"oversee" world trade and resolve disputes. The GATT was never given an
adequate organizational structure and its dispute resolution procedures were rudimentary. However, the proposed ITO was never created, due to the failure of
the United States to ratify it. Because the ITO never came into being, the GATT
became the de facto institution for managing world trade issues and resolving
international disputes. While the GATT has had notable success, due to the
creative institutional improvisation of its leaders, the institutional weakness resulting from the GATT's creation has hampered the management of the world
trade system and the effective resolution of international disputes. These problems
have spurred repeated Congressional criticism of the current multilateral trade
framework and statements emphasizing the need for improvement. 3
The 1979 Tokyo Round agreements were an important accomplishment, but
they have demonstrated some of the GATT's institutional difficulties. The Tokyo
Round produced nine separate agreements that frequently have institutional mechanisms to manage international trade, distinct from the GATT itself (e.g. the
creation of an International Dairy Products Council, an International Meat Council, etc.). The agreements often deal with issues that are also dealt with in the
GATT (e.g. subsidies), resulting in duplication and contradictions. Many of the
Tokyo Round agreements have separate dispute resolution procedures (e.g. the
Subsidies Code, the Antidumping Code, the Government Procurement Code,
etc.). The fragmentation of dispute settlement leads to several problems, such
as overlapping jurisdiction over particular disputes, the potential for conflicting
rulings, unnecessary complexity, and added costs.
In addition, the Tokyo Round agreements considerably expanded the range
of substantive issues subject to multilateral regulation (e.g. non-tariff barriers
and government procurement). This expansion has added significantly to the
administrative and institutional burden on the GATT. The Uruguay Round also
would add a number of important new substantive multilateral rules (e.g. extending rules to international trade in services and the rules on trade-related
investment measures (TRIMs) and trade-related intellectual property rights
3. See H. Rep. No. 99-581, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 123 (1986) (stating that "the strengthening
of mechanisms and procedures for dispute settlement is ... essential for restoring the credibility
of international trade institutions"); H. Rep. No. 96-317, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 22 (1979) ("there
is a danger that trade relations between countries can return to the bilateral myopia of the 1930's,
particularly if a serious world recession were to occur. Therefore, the Committee recognizes the
great need for viewing the end of the [Tokyo Round] as only the beginning of efforts to further
strengthen the international system of rules and dispute settlement").
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(TRIPs)). This trend could continue after the Uruguay Round into areas such as
the trade impact of environmental measures and the role of competition policy.
The expansion of GATT disciplines will increase the burden on GATT institutions
and dispute settlement procedures, thereby underscoring the need for substantial
improvement in these areas.
In the Uruguay Round, GATT members recognized the importance of addressing these fundamental institutional questions that affect the successful operation of the GATT and its substantive rules. The 1986 Punta del Este declaration,
which marked the beginning of the Uruguay Round, specifically refers to these
issues. To this end, the Uruguay Round discussions have focused on two general
areas: (1) the improvement of the GATT dispute resolution procedures; and (2)
the creation of a stronger institutional framework for the multilateral trading
system.
The results of the Uruguay Round discussions in these areas are reflected in
a draft issued in December 1991 by the Director General of the GATT, Arthur
Dunkel, summarizing the agreements that he believed had been reached in the
Uruguay Round negotiations (the "Dunkel Draft"). The Dunkel Draft contains
two linked agreements on dispute settlement and an agreement establishing the
Multilateral Trade Organization (MTO). The next sections discuss the particular
problems addressed in these agreements and further ongoing negotiations, and
express support for the general principles proposed in these efforts.
IV. Need to Strengthen Dispute Resolution Procedures
Since the 1950s, the GATT practice has been to refer a dispute to a specially
appointed panel of experts. The panel examines the dispute and submits a report
to the GATT Council. A panel report itself has no legal force, but is the considered
opinion of a panel of expert members. To be effective, the panel report must be
adopted by the GATT Council. If the GATT Council adopts the panel report,
it may request the offending country to remove its measures, or may authorize
the complaining country to withdraw trade concessions made to the offending
country.
At the start of the Uruguay Round, governments generally agreed that the core
problem with the GATT dispute settlement procedures is the need for consensus.
Under current practice, a panel report will not be adopted over the objection of
any party including the offending country. If a GATT dispute settlement panel
rules against a country, that country is able to block adoption of that ruling by
the GATT Council.
In a significant number of recent cases, GATT members have used the consensus requirement to block the dispute settlement procedures. Although the United
States has itself blocked some GATT panel reports for a limited period of time,
it has been troubled by blockages by other countries, particularly the European
Community's blocking of panel reports on subsidy issues regarding agricultural
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products. Such actions are particularly common in actions brought under the
Subsidies Code dispute settlement procedures (which are very similar to the
general GATT procedures): since 1983, one or more signatories have blocked
the adoption of all panel reports under the Subsidies Code.
The Uruguay Round proposals for dispute settlement reform would improve
the GATT dispute settlement procedures by eliminating the offending country's
ability to block GATT action, and creating an appeal procedure instead. An
appellate body would be established to hear appeals of panel cases, with its
members to be persons of recognized authority and expertise in law, international
trade, and the GATT. The proposed ABA Recommendation supports such an
appellate procedure.
In addition, the agreements would create a unified dispute resolution procedure
to address the problem of multiple procedures resulting from the Tokyo Round
agreements (discussed above). By creating a unified dispute resolution procedure,
the proposals would resolve the current difficulties arising from overlapping
jurisdiction and avoid the potential for conflicting rulings.
As noted above, the ABA Recommendation supports the general approach of
the draft agreements reached in the Uruguay Round on dispute resolution procedures but does not endorse every detail of those agreements. While the reforms
described above are the cornerstone of an effective dispute resolution system,
the agreements could be improved by the addition of several measures. First, the
GATT dispute resolution procedures are excessively confidential. The proposed
ABA Recommendation suggests, therefore, "greater transparency." The public
should be given timely access to relevant legal sources, within budget constraints
and administrative practicality. Second, the GATT dispute resolution procedures
should provide better opportunity for the utilization of scientific expertise such
as the submission to panels of expert testimony, information and arguments,
from a variety of non-governmental interested parties. Third, the GATT budget
should be examined to ensure that it can support an effective and creditable
dispute resolution system, which would support the human and other resources
necessary to produce high quality decisions, given the expanding case load.
V. Need for a Multilateral Trade Organization
As discussed above, the de facto development of the GATT has not created
a basic institution capable of facilitating the smooth functioning of the world
trading system. The growing importance and complexity of global trade relations
make it imperative to create an appropriate institutional framework to administer
the substantive rules governing these relations. While the institutional weakness of
the trading system may have been adequate to the simpler and less interdependent
relations following World War II, the current structure makes it more difficult
to cope with the explosion in the number of participants in international trade
and in the rules governing this trade. Without rapid and significant improvements
VOL. 28, NO. 2
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in the current structure, the current tendency towards unilateral actions and bilateral trading blocs is likely to accelerate, worsening the fragmentation of the global
trading system. A multilateral trade organization can play an essential role in
moderating the difficulties and tensions that accompany the expansion of the
world trading system.
In addition to the GATT's general institutional weakness, there are particular
problems with its operation. The GATT is very difficult to amend, since certain
amendments require unanimous acceptance while others require only two-thirds
acceptance but are only binding on those countries that accept the amendment.
The GATT lacks a definitive legal basis as an international organization, which
affects its status in the domestic law of a number of member countries and its
relationship to the other international economic institutions. The numerous sideagreements often overlap with the GATT itself, and encourage countries to opt
out of obligations that are not exactly to their liking rather than accepting the
obligations in order to receive the broader benefits of GATT membership.
While the current Recommendation does not endorse all aspects of the draft
Agreement to establish the multilateral trade organization (MTO), it does support
the general proposal to establish a new limited institutional structure for world
trade. The proposals should strengthen the amending procedure, perhaps by providing special voting procedures to require some important amendments to be
accepted by all members. The new institution should have a definitive legal basis,
permitting a clear status under international law, enhancing its ability to interact
with other international economic institutions, and enabling the trade institution
to administer the unified dispute resolution mechanism discussed above. The
agreement for a new institution would also serve as the basis for a "single undertaking," i.e. the mechanism through which nations would accept the results of
the Uruguay Round. As such, this agreement would discourage countries from
adopting a piece-meal approach to the results of the Uruguay Round. Thus, an
MTO or comparable institutional reform for the GATT system is an essential
part of effective implementation of the results of the Uruguay Round, and for
the extension of the rule-oriented approach to the new issues of that round, such
as services and intellectual property.
A multilateral trade organization should be carefully limited to the necessary
procedural reforms, and should therefore not be considered a new "International
Trade Organization." Unlike the ITO, a new trade institution would not contain
substantive obligations. The substantive obligations would continue to be expressed in the updated GATT, and in the other agreements and documents resulting from the Uruguay Round, which would be appended to the institution.
Thus, the procedural nature of the reforms of the multilateral trade framework
would not allow the imposition of additional substantive obligations on member
states, unless there were subsequent treaty agreements or amendments.
There has been some concern that GATT dispute resolution panels, or a multilateral trade organization, could impose binding obligations on United States
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domestic law and thereby overrule substantive U.S. law in areas such as environmental regulation. However, the United States constitutional law and practice
would not apply the results of a dispute settlement procedure directly in United
States domestic law (i.e. the results would not be "self-executing"). It generally
requires an act of Congress to implement the necessary changes to conform with
the international ruling, and Congress (or in some cases the Executive) therefore
has adequate opportunity to consider the issues involved. An agreement creating
a multilateral trade organization would also require United States implementing
legislation, which could address some of these questions.
VI. Conclusion
By means of this resolution, the American Bar Association would support the
timely conclusion of an agreement in the current round of multilateral trade
negotiations, underscore the importance of improved procedures for settling multilateral trade disputes, and encourage the establishment of an effective multilateral trade organization that would foster better implementation of the substantive
rules governing international trade. In so doing, the American Bar Association
would express its support for continuing and maintaining a system of rules that
has fostered economic growth and prosperity over the last four decades.

August 1993
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Respectfully submitted,
Louis B. Sohn
Chair
Section of International
Law and Practice

